

1508/631

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THE
COUNTERPOISE;

O R,

B---g and the M---y fairly stated.

BY A

BY-STANDER.

WHEREIN,

Not only all what has yet appeared in Print for
and against the A---l, is impartially dis-
cussed, with that Freedom becoming an
ENGLISHMAN, who has the Honour and
Liberties of his Country at Heart :

BUT ALSO,

Such Lights are thrown upon the Subject, as the
Connections of each Party have hitherto concealed,
which develope this mysterious Affair, and render
it intelligible to every unprejudiced Reader.

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cussed, with the freedom becoming an
Englishman, who has the honour and
interest of his Country at heart.

W. H. A. S. O.

Such is the nature of the subject, as the
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to 22nd June



T H E
C O U N T E R P O I S E :

O R,

[B—g and the M——y fairly stated.



T this critical Juncture, when we are engaged in an expensive War with an ambitious and enterprising Neighbour, whose sole Aim has been for more than a Century to extend his Dominion over all *Europe* ; when the ill Success of our Fleet, has occasioned the Loss of a valuable Possession, both to our Trade and Navigation, which our Enemies will not fail to make the best Use of for annoying us ; when the Commander in Chief of an inglorious Expedition is upon the Point of being tried for his Conduct, while all Ar-

tifices are used to blind the People ; it surely is the Part of every honest Citizen, to use his best Endeavours to unravel the Truth of a mysterious Affair, wherein every Individual is concerned, and has a Right to be acquainted with the true Merits of the Cause, that it may be justly and speedily determined, and the Attention of our Ministers be no longer occupied with domestic Jarrs, but properly fixed upon the Measures and Designs of the common Enemy, in order to circumvent them.

Without any Party Connections, unbribed, and no way interested but as an Englishman, I have taken up the Pen, not to mislead, by a false Representation of real, or the Substitution of imaginary Facts, but to developé this Affair, and set it in the clearest Light I can, in order that every Man may judge for himself, and not be imposed upon by the Sophistry of the prejudiced Hireling.

In the Course of this Work, it will be necessary to examine, with some Particularity, three Pieces, which have appeared in Favour of Mr. B—g ; namely, “ A Letter to a Member of Parliament ;” “ An Appeal to the People ;” and “ Some further Particulars in relation to the Case of Mr. B—g.”



The

The Letter to a Member of Parliament comes then, in this Order, the first under my Cognizance.—This Letter is wrote from a supposed Profelyte to the Cause of Mr. B—g, who, aware of the Artifice made use of by M—rs to divert the public Attention, from a *real* to an *ideal* Offender, had nevertheless partook of the general Delusion, though he was preinformed of the Omissions made in the Ad—l's Letter (published in the *Gazette*) and which at length worked his Reformation; such does the Author of this Letter represent himself to be! After a few verbose Exclamations, he asks, Why were several Passages in it refused the Benefit of the Press? and then that Obscurity imputed to the Author, which those very Castrations had created? Before I make any further Comment upon this, I shall take the Liberty of putting Mr. B—g's Letters before the Reader's View, with the Additions this Letter Writer has furnished us with; that he may, without being obliged to refer to any other Piece, have it at Hand, as an Index to Mr. B—g's Conduct, as related by himself.

Ramilles, off Minorca, May 25, 1756.

S I R,

I Have the Pleasure to desire you will acquaint their Lordships, that having failed

from Gibraltar the 8th, I got off *Mahon* the
 19th, having been join'd by his Majesty's Ship
Phoenix, off *Minorca*, two Days before, " by
 " whom I had confirmed the Intelligence I re-
 " ceived at Gibraltar, of the Strength of the
 " French Fleet, and of their being off Mahon.
 " His Majesty's Colours were still flying at the
 " Castle of St. Philip's, and I could perceive se-
 " veral Bomb Batteries playing upon it from
 " different Parts; French Colours we saw fly-
 " ing in the West Part of St. Philip's. I dis-
 " patched the *Phoenix*, *Chesterfield*, and *Dol-*
 " *phin* a-head, to reconnoitre the Harbour's
 " Mouth, and Captain Hervey, to endeavour to
 " land a Letter for General Blakeney, to let
 " him know the Fleet was here to his Assistance,
 " tho' every one was of Opinion, we could be of
 " no Use to him, as by all Accounts no Place
 " was secured for covering a Landing, could
 " we have spared any People. The *Phoenix* was
 " also to make the private Signal between Cap-
 " tain Hervey and Captain Scrope, as this lat-
 " ter would undoubtedly come off if it were
 " practicable, having kept the *Dolphin's* Barge
 " with him; but the Enemy's Fleet appearing
 " to the South East, and the Wind at the same
 " Time coming strong off the Land, obliged me
 " to call those Ships in, before they could get
 " quite so near the Entrance of the Harbour,
 " as to make sure what Batteries or Guns might
 " be placed to prevent our having any Commu-
 " nication

"*nication with the Castle.*" When the Enemy's Fleet appeared to the South East, falling little Wind, it was Five before I could form my Line, and distinguish any of the Enemy's Motions, and not at all judge of their Force, more than by their Numbers, which were Seventeen, and Thirteen of those appeared large. They at first stood towards us in a regular Line, and tacked about Seven, which I judged was to gain the Wind of us in the Night; so that being late, I tacked in order to keep the Weather-Gage of them, as well as to make sure of the Land Wind: In the Morning, being very hazy, and not above five Leagues off *Cape Mola*, we tacked off towards the Enemy at Eleven, and at Day-Light had no Sight of them; but two *Tartans*, with the *French* private Signal, being close in with the Rear of our Fleet, I sent the *Princess Louisa* to chase one, and made the Signal for the Rear Admiral, who was nearest the other, to send Ships to chase her; the *Princess Louisa*, *Defiance* and *Captain*, became at a great Distance, but the *Defiance* took hers, which had two Captains, two Lieutenants, and 102 private Soldiers, who were sent out the Day before with 600 Men on board *Tartans*, to reinforce the *French* Fleet, on our then appearing off the Place; the *Phoenix* (on Captain *Hervey's* Offer) prepared to serve as a Fire-Ship, but without damaging her as a Frigate,

till the Signal was made to prime, when she was then to scuttle her Decks, every thing else being prepared that the Time and Place allowed of. The Enemy now began to appear from the Mast-head: I called in the Cruizers, and when they had joined me, I tacked towards the Enemy, and formed the Line a-head; I found the *French* were preparing theirs to Lee-ward, having unsuccessfully endeavoured to weather me: They were twelve large Ships of the Line and five Frigates: As soon as I judged the Rear of ours was the Length of their Van, we tacked all together, and I immediately made the Signal to engage, as I found it the surest Method, of ordering every Ship close down on the one that fell to their Lot. And here I must express my great Satisfaction at the very gallant Manner in which the Rear Admiral set the Van the Example, by instantly bearing down on the Ships he was to engage, with his Second, and who occasioned one of the *French* Ships to begin the Engagement, which they did by raking ours as they went down. I bore right down on the Ship that lay opposite to me, and began to engage him, after having received their Fire for some Time on going down. The *Intrepid*, in the very Beginning, had her Fore-top-mast shot away, and as that hung on the Fore-sail and backed it, he had no Command of his Ship, his Fore-tack and all his Braces being cut

cut at the same Time, so that he drove on the next Ship to him, and obliged that and the Ships a-head of me to throw all a-back: This obliged me to do so also for some Minutes, to avoid their falling all on board me, though not before we had drove our Adversary out of the Line, who put before the Wind, and had several Shot fired at him by his own Admiral. This not only caused the Enemy's Centre to be unattacked, but left the Rear Admiral's Division rather uncover'd for some very little Time. I sent and called to the Ships a-head of me, to make Sail on, and go down on the Enemy, and ordered the *Chesterfield* to lay by the *Intrepid*, and the *Deptford* to supply the *Intrepid's* Place. I found the Enemy edged away constantly; and as they went three Feet to our one, they would never permit our closing with them, but take the Advantage of destroying our Rigging; for though I closed the Rear Admiral fast, yet I found I could not again close the Enemy, whose Van were fairly drove from the Line, but their Admiral was joining them by bearing away. By this Time it was past Six, and the Enemy's Van and ours were at too great a Distance to engage; I perceived some of their Ships stretching to the Northward, and I imagined they were going to form a new Line; I made the Signal for the headmost Ships to tack, and those that led before with the
larboard

larboard Tacks, to lead with the Starboard, that I might by the first keep (if possible) the Wind of the Enemy; and, by the second, be between the Rear Admiral's Division and the Enemy, as his had suffered most, as also to cover the *Intrepid*, which I perceived to be in a very bad Condition, and whose Loss would give the Balance against us, if they attacked us the next Morning, as I expected. I brought too about Eight that Night, to join the *Intrepid*, and to re-fit our Ships as fast as possible, and continued so all Night. The next Morning we saw nothing of the Enemy, tho' we were still laying too. *Mahon* was N. N. W. about ten or eleven Leagues. I sent Cruisers out to look for the *Intrepid* and *Chesterfield*, who joined me the next Day; and having, from a State and Condition of the Squadron brought me in, found that the Captain, *Intrepid* and *Defiance* (which latter has lost her Captain) were very much damaged in their Masts, "So that they were endangered of not being able to secure their Masts properly at Sea; and also, that the Squadron in general were very sickly, many killed and wounded, and no where to put a Third of their Number, if I made an Hospital even of the Forty Gun Ship, which was not easy at Sea." I thought it proper, in this Situation, to call a Council of War, before I went again to look for the Enemy. I desired the Attendance

ance of General Stewart, Lord Effingham,
 and Lord Robert Bertie, and Col. Cornwallis,
 that I might collect their Opinions upon the
 present Situation “ of Minorca and Gibraltar,
 “ and make sure of protecting the Latter, since
 “ it was found impracticable to either succour
 “ or relieve the former with the Force we had;
 “ for though we may justly claim the Victory,
 “ yet we are much inferior to the Weight of their
 “ Ships, tho’ the Numbers are equal, and they
 “ have the Advantage of sending to Minorca
 “ their wounded, and getting Reinforcements of
 “ Seamen from their Transports, and Soldiers
 “ from their Camp, all which undoubtedly has
 “ been done in this Time, that we have been lay-
 “ ing too to refit, and often in Sight of Minorca,
 “ and their Ships have more than once appeared
 “ in a Line from our Mast-heads. I send their
 “ Lordships the Resolution of the Council of
 “ War,” at which Council not the least Con-
 tention or Doubt arose. “ I hope indeed we
 “ shall find Stores to refit us at Gibraltar, and
 “ if I have any Reinforcement will not lose a
 “ Moment’s Time to seek the Enemy again, and
 “ once more give them Battle, tho’ they have
 “ a great Advantage in being clean Ships, that
 “ go three Feet to our one, and therefore have the
 “ Choice how they will engage us, or if they will
 “ at all, and will never let us close them, as their
 “ sole View is the disabling our Ships, in which
 “ they have but too well succeeded, tho’ we ob-
 “ liged

"*liged them to bear up.*" I do not send their Lordships the particulars of our Losses and Damages by this, as it would take me much Time, and that I am willing none should be lost in letting them know an Event of such Consequence. "*I cannot help urging their Lordships for a Reinforcement, if none are yet sailed, on their knowledge of the Enemy's Strength in these Seas, and which, by very good Intelligence, will in a few Days be strengthened by four large Ships from Toulon, almost ready to sail, if not now sailed to join them.*" I dispatch this to Sir Benjamin Keene, by the way of Barcelona, and am making the best of my Way to "*cover*" Gibraltar, from which Place I propose sending their Lordships a more particular Account.

P. S. I must desire you will acquaint their Lordships I have appointed Captain *Hervey* to the Command of the *Defiance* in the Room of Captain *Andrews*, slain in the Action.

I have just sent the Defects of the Ships, as I have got it made out whilst I was closing my Letter.

Here then, is the letter as complete as Mr. B—g himself could have desired it to have been published; and I leave it to the judgment of the candid reader, whether the

Additions

Additions between Commas in Italics have added any Perspicuity to it, or whether they themselves are not replete with Confusion. Does the Letter Writer think he rescues Mr. B——'s Character, by re-establishing the first castrated Part, wherein we are informed he sent three Frigates "to reconnoitre the Harbour's Mouth, and land a letter;" when every reasonable person must be apprised, that the Sloop alone would have been sufficient for this Errand, which need not have been called off upon the Appearance of the *French*, any more than the three Frigates, since they were sent, and were not afterwards employed in the Action? The second Omission of the *Gazette*, I think saved Mr. B——g a good deal of Trouble of explaining away the *Irish* of it; for as it is uncusomary to put either sick or wounded on Board an Hospital Ship, and as he begins complaining, many were killed, and no where to put a third on Board, even if he made an Hospital of the Forty Gun Ship: It would have been necessary to have added a note to this, to have told us he did not mean what he said—and another to inform us he meant what he did not *say*, in the Beginning of the same Period, where he writes "so that they were endangered of not being able to secure their Mast properly at Sea."——I would be glad to know if all Ships that put to Sea, do not run the same Risk?

Risk? The next Paragraph which is reinstated relates to the Subject Matter of the Council of War, which was the Situation of *Minorca* and *Gibraltar*, a point which he was not sent out to examine;—he was sent to relieve *Minorca*, and beat the *French* Fleet in the Way if he met it. The other two omissions of any importance, relate to his Expectation of meeting with Stores at *Gibraltar* to refit, and the necessity of being reinforced; Subjects which were neither proper nor necessary to acquaint the Publick with, since they no way related to his Conduct on the 20th of *May*. Such are the Mutilations of Mr. B—'s Letter, which are so much complained of, by the Writer of this Letter, which to be sure have added great Propriety and Heroism to the Representation of his Conduct! As to the word *cover*, I will suppose with the Letter Writer the Reason of its Omission, was on account of the public's Ignorance of its Reference, if it had any. But is not the more probable Cause this—If Mr. B—g was instructed to cover *Gibraltar*, which is a Point of the Ministry, and he alone are yet acquainted with; to have published this while the *Spaniards*, in whose Power only it is to really annoy us in that Part, were our fast Friends, and the only *French* Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, or indeed in *Europe*, had been beat by six Ships of ours, would have been very injudicious, since it must have manifested
our

our jealousy of the *Spanish* Court, who might take Occasion from thence to break with us ; nor do I think it has any wise displayed the Politician in Mr. B—g (if he pretends to have any Regard for his Country) to have rendered public, the Conjunction still continuing, such Part of his Letter which related to Instructions, that might give Umbrage to his *Catholic* Majesty. But waving these Considerations, as the Omission of the Word no way altered the Sense of the Letter (which would have been a Pity indeed !) and as that published in the *Gazette* was acknowledged to be an Extract, he must be a Madman, who would rant at the M——y, for not publishing his Dispatches in the *Gazette*, whether they are to the Purpose or no, or whether fit or not to be communicated to the whole World. Yet it is upon a similar Occasion, that the Letter Writer discovers great Roguery in the M——rs — I mean for not publishing Mr. B—g's Letter of the 4th of *May*, wherein, if there is any Thing proper for publick notice, it is, “ If I should fail in the Relief of *Portmahon* (what a Thought ! before, according to his own Account, he was acquainted with the Strength of the *French* Fleet — when, according to the same Letter, it was composed but of thirteen Men of War, Frigates included) I shall look upon the Security and Protection of *Gibraltar* as my next Object, and shall repair down here
(that

(that is *Gibraltar*) with the Squadron." If the Delphic Oracle had pronounced the Success of *B—g's* Expedition, could he have uttered a mere verified Decree? How far it was predicted on the Part of *B—g* the Reader may easily perceive.

There is nothing more to be observed in the Letter to a Member of Parliament, if not, that *B—g's* Letter of the 4th of *July*, which has underwent many more Amputations by a common Apothecary (and not a State Surgeon) than his of the 25th of *May* did, as published in the *Gazette*, is one of the most complete *Gascnades*, that has been exhibited to public View a great while, and indeed I should have taken it for *M. de la Gallissonniere*, or any other Native of *Goscoyne's* Epistle, if they did not profess the Christian Religion (though not with that Purity we do) sufficiently to be informed there is an Omnipotent—a Point the Writer of that Letter seems to be utterly unacquainted with, otherwise I should imagine the following Passage would hardly have found a Place there. " 'Tis not now for me to expostulate ;
" I flatter myself, that Mr. *West* * and I shall
" make evident the Injury done to our Charac-

* Tolerably artful—What Injury, pray, has been done Mr. *West*, has he not been honoured and revered by every one for his opposite Conduct to that of Mr. *B—* on the 20th of *May*.

“ ters, which I know of nothing in the Pow-
 “ er of *any Being whatever* that can atone
 “ for.”

I now come to *the Appeal to the People*.
 This Piece, which has with uncommon Ad-
 drefs been circulated throughout all Parts of
 this Kingdom and *Ireland*, by the Agents of
 the A——l, after having with much *Tauto-*
logy, and as little Accuracy, let us know, that
 weak M——rs, who have not heads to plan
 any successful Measures, have yet cunning e-
 nough to throw the Blame upon the principal
 Actor or Executor of their ill-concerted Mea-
 sures, introduces the Letter I have before in-
 serted, but with so many intentional Mistakes,
 that since the Author of the Appeal could de-
 scend to such minute Particulars, and pretend
 to discover great Fraud in the Omission of what
 he calls a Monosyllable (*cover*) I think it is
 but just to make Reprisals, and detect him
 where he has endeavoured to strain the Sense
 (or Nonsense) of some Parts of this Letter, by
 Omissions and Alterations: As for Instance
 (p. 17.) after the word *Castle* in Italics the
 following Castration, “ when the Enemy’s
 “ Fleet appeared to the S. E.” next Line,
 instead of the Word “ *and*” he has put “ *or* ;”
 two Lines following, after the Word *Thir-*
teen, he has omitted “ of those.” P. 19. l. 7.
 B instead

instead of "*their*" he has put "*the*." P. 20. l. 17. after the Word "*would*," he thought proper to add "*very greatly*." P. 21. l. 4. from the Bottom, he has put "*in which*" instead of "*at which Council*;" besides numerous other designed Alterations, and Changes in the Punctuation, purposely to alter the Signification, which, after all, he cannot wrest to any tolerable Meaning.

But why do I dwell upon such trifling Falsifications, when compared to those of so much superior Note, and which tend with the others to prove the Author a servile Hireling?

The grand Point that this Writer endeavours to prove is, that Mr. B—'s Squadron was inferior to M. de la Gallissonniere's; and yet we find the Admiral was of another Opinion, even when he was informed of the true State of the *French*, by the Account thereof given him by a *French* Officer, taken on board a Tartan the Morning before the Action; otherwise why did he throw the *Deptford* out of the Line, and by that Means reduce the number of Guns of his Fleet by fifty? Can this prove that he had a Mind to gain a Victory, after he was convinced, as the Appealer pretends, that sixteen *English* Ships of equal Force to those Mr. B—g's Fleet was composed of, would

would only have been a Match for the twelve *French* ones ? The only sophisticated Solution he gives for the *Ænigmatical* Conduct of the A—l, in throwing the *Deptford* out of the Line, tho' a *Ship of the Line*, is because the *French* Admiral did not take the *Junon*, a *Frigate only*, in ; whereas if the Case had been parallel, and the *Junon* had been a Ship of the Line, which it was not, he must have been very ignorant himself, or fancied his Readers much more so, in giving this as a Reason for the A—l's Behaviour upon this Occasion ; first, because every School-boy knows, the Errors of your Enemy are not to be the Rule of your Action, but improved diametrically opposite to your own Advantage ; and secondly, as he is so well convinced, that the twelve *French* Ships of the Line were equal to sixteen *English* of the same Rate as the twelve of B——g's Squadron, an increase of Number would have been more cumbersome than useful to the *French*, as they could not have been beat for want of Strength, but Valour or Conduct.

But there is no arguing against Conviction ; it's plain the Admiral acted right, and like a judicious Seaman, since although the *French* were so superior originally, and he had increased their Superiority as much as in him lay, by reducing the Strength of his own Fleet, he never-

theless gained not only the Victory——but with six Ships of his Squadron—— with the Division of the Rear Admiral.

To reason fairly, Was the Admiral acquainted with the real State of the *French* Fleet, before it appeared in Sight on the 20th of *May*? Yes. Was it either increased, diminished or changed, in any Shape, when it engaged, from the State given of it by the *French* Officers, taken on board the *Tartan*? No. If the engaging the *French* could be of no Use in succouring *Mahon*, even if a Conquest had fallen to the *English*; and as it appeared the Advantage was of the *French* Side, would it not have been prudent to have avoided the *French*? Yes. If accident had thrown the *French* in their Way, should they not have taken all Advantages to endeavour to counterpoise the Superiority of the *French* instead of increase it? Yes. If, although contrary to Expectation, they not only were able to cope with the *French*, but actually beat them—— and with half the Squadron *only*, should they not have pursued the Advantage which Victory on their Side, and Terror on that of their Enemies, had given them over the *French*, even with all their Squadron, since (to judge by the Success of six Ships) that must *reasonably* have gained a complete Victory, and caused a demolition of all

Gallisson-

Gallissonniere's Squadron ? Yes. Or whether, if the *French* were so nimble healed (although it's next to impossible but what in the Pursuit, some of their worst Sailors must have fell into our Hands ; since notwithstanding all the *Logie* used to prove our Squadron so extremely foul, there were but three Ships of it which had not been cleaned since the *March* preceding) as to have made off unmolested, should they not have remained Masters of the Port, and prevented any Succours being sent to *Richlieu* ?
Yes.

Now let us examine how the Ad——l's Conduct corresponded with these Principles. Instead of avoiding the *French* Fleet, as he might have easily done, by sailing round the Island (and every body is positive that he might have landed an Express for General *Blakeney* at any Part of the Island except *Mabon* ; and indeed the ablest Engineers are of Opinion that he might even there, as one of the *Sallee* Ports was entirely sheltered from the Enemy ; and by this Means have concerted the best Plan of Operations with the General) he began to turn the *Phœnix*, a twenty Gun Ship, into a Fire-ship, by which he evidently reduced the Force of his Squadron ; and it could, according to his own Account, be of no Use in that Capacity, since “ they had the Choice how
B 3 “ they

“ they would engage us, or if they would at
 “ at all, and will never let us close them, as
 “ their sole View is the disabling our Ships,
 “ in which they have but too well succeed-
 “ ed?”

How far he took all Advantages of making up for the pretended Disparity of their Force, is evident by his converting the *Phœnix* into a Fire-ship, and turning the *Deptford* out of the Line, by which he gave the *French* an additional Advantage of seventy Guns. That they did not pursue their Success, is manifest, altho' they might, notwithstanding the *French* went three Feet to their one, as “ they had more
 “ than once appeared in a Line (*to brave us to*
 “ *fight*, he might have added) from our Mast-
 “ heads.” In regard to their remaining Masters of the Port, it's only necessary to cite two Passages of the Ad——l's Letter, the first of which says, before the Action they were not above five Leagues off *Cape Mola*, and in the second, he says, the Fleet on the 21st was got *ten or eleven* Leagues N. N. W. of *Mahon*, that is to say, near fourteen Leagues, N. by W. of *Cape Mola*.

In all that I have urged hitherto concerning the Disposition of the Fleet, I have not dissented to the Position which Mr. *Appealer* lays down

down as the Basis of all his Argument ; which is, “ that the *French* Fleet had the Superiority “ of Weight of Metal ;” but suppose, upon Examination, this Position should prove absolutely false, will not my Readers agree (even if they should not be versed in Logic) that all the Consequences drawn from thence, must be without Foundation ?

He thought proper to make the following Alterations in the Number of Guns of the Ships of the Line, which composed the *English* Fleet : The *Buckingham* from 70 is reduced to 68 Guns ; the *Captain* from 70 to 64 ; the *Princess Louisa* from 60 to 56 ; and the *Portland* from 50 to 48 ; and augmented the Guns of the *French* Ships as follows : The *Fouy-droyant* from 80 to 84 ; the *Hypopotame* from 50 to 64 ; the *Fier* from 50 to 64 ; by which Means the Number of Guns on Board the *English* Fleet was decreased from 798 to 778, and that of the *French* Fleet increased from 748 to 828 ; as the Reader will plainly perceive by the following authentic List.

<i>English Fleet.</i>		<i>French Fleet.</i>	
<i>Ships Names.</i>	<i>Guns.</i>	<i>Ships Names.</i>	<i>Guns.</i>
Ramillies	90	Le Foudroyant	80
Buckingham	70	Le Redoutable	74
Culloden	74	Le Guerrier	74
Captain	70	Le Teméraire	74
Revenge	70	La Couronne	74
Lancaster	66	Le Triton	64
Trident	64	Le Lion	64
Intrepid	64	Le Sage	64
Kingston	60	L'Orphée	64
Princess Louisa	60	Le Content	64
Defiance	60	L'Hipopotame	50
Portland	50	Le Fier	50
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Total 798		Total 796	

Now if Mr. B——g had not injudiciously thrown the *Deptford* out of the Line, the Number of Cannons would have been in our Favour, as the Proportion of 838 to 796, as must be obvious to every Reader. But it is not surprizing that this Ship should not be included in the Line, all the Wonder is, that it should have been included in the List, since the *Fortune* Sloop of 14 Guns, which made as much Part of his Fleet, as any other of his Frigates, was thought unworthy of Mention in the Lists, published both in the Letter to

to a Member of Parliament, and the Appeal.
 —For what Reason is but too plain, since the Telescope, which magnifies the Strength of the *French* Fleet, has, in every instance this Author produces, its other end turned to us when we are to view our own Fleet.

But not content with having, by all the Artifice he was master of, reduced the number of Guns on Board our Fleet, and augmented those of the *French*, (as indeed he must have been ashamed to acknowledge himself an *Englishman*, and with the State of the Fleets, even as he is pleased to represent them, pretend that our's should have *run away* from the *French*) he endeavours to prove, that their Weight of Metal is greater than ours, by the most glaring Falsity that ever was pen'd—in short, he has the Impudence to build every Thing that is drawn from this Argument upon his Assertion, that “ a *Thirty-six Pounder French*, is almost equal to a *forty-two Pound Shot English**”, Did he not consider that we all know the exact Difference between our Weight and the *French*, or was he so ignorant as to be uninformed, that a hundred Weight *French*, is equal to a *hundred and nine Pounds, eight ounces only, English*? If he was, as there is much Reason to believe, by several

* See Page 35 of the *Appeal*.

other of his curious Calculations—he is pardonable for the Mistake, but very culpable as a Writer, who pretends to *calculate* his Readers out of *Truth* and their *Reason*. If then the *French* Hundred Weight is equal to a *hundred and nine Pounds, eight Ounces English*, the *French* thirty-two Pounds can surely be equal to no more than thirty-five Pounds (and a Fraction) *English*. But upon such Foundations are the Reasons in the appeal built; and indeed this is the Basis of the Principal, if not only Argument in the whole Piece; for he tells us immediately after, it is by this Computation “the *Weights* (of the *French*) are reduced to “the *English* Standard.”

After this it would be needless to make any more Comments upon Mr. *Appealer*, who, by unhappily disclosing this Mystery, has laid himself, and the writer of the Letter to a Member of Parliament, open to the clearest Conviction; as the State of the Fleets there inserted, are false and groundless in every Particular that relate to the *French* Weight of Metal, which is reduced to the *English* Standard by the above Calculation; and as all their Arguments to prove *de la Gallissonniere's* Fleet superior to the *English*, are built upon that Hypothesis.

To

To exult over these blind Scriblers would be unmerciful—therefore I shall dismiss them and examine what the Writer of a Pamphlet, entitled, “Further Particulars in Relation to the Case of Mr. B——” has to urge in his Favour.

This Pamphlet, which the Title-page informs us, is wrote by a Gentlemen of *Oxford*, has so much resemblance in its Stile and Argument to the Appeal to the People, that one might venture, without being very incredulous, to attribute it to the same Author—but however, we will take this Writer’s Word for the place of his Residence.

After having paid some few Compliments to the Publick, upon its good nature, and endeavoured to asperse the M——y for the Misfortunes that have befallen this Nation, in the *Mediterranean*, he takes great Pains to let us know what we all knew before—that the Admiral could not get his Ships manned and ready to sail from *Spithead* before the fifth of *April*; with this Distinction, that the twelve other Ships which were then at *Spithead*, were not compleatly manned (as he has been pleased to assert) altho’ the Ad——I was not permitted to make up his Complement from them. But as there is nothing
more

more easy than to assert or deny such Circumstances, when not supported by any Authority and which, in Reality, have no Connection with his Expedition in the *Mediterranean*; I will not take much Pains to confute him, but leave it to his Readers either to believe or disbelieve, as they shall think proper. This learned Disputant, with much Circumlocution, reasons upon the Instructions of Mr. B—g, which, because they contained some discretionary Clauses, (such as the dividing the Fleet in Case the *Toulon* Squadron should sail for *America*; which after all was not an improbable Event, since many of the Officers on Board did not know its real Destination, till after it was sailed) he would endeavour to persuade the Publick, contained no Orders for Fighting, and that they all “depending upon Events, were accordingly to be observed or not, as Circumstances agreed, or otherwise” But tho’ the Reader might have perceived the Drift of these Insinuations, without any Confutation on the Writer’s Part, it being the Fatality of all Mr. B—g’s Advocates, to *unsay* in one Page what they had said a Page or two before; our *Oxonian* tells us immediately after, that Mr. B—g’s Instructions contained the following Passage; “If the *French* were still inactive in Port, in which Case he was to station his Squadron in the “best

“ best Manner to prevent their getting out :
 “ And he was now to use all possible Means
 “ in his Power for the Relief of the Place
 “ (*Minorca*), as also to protect the Trade of his
 “ Majesty’s Subjects, and to annoy the Enemy
 “ where ever they might be found within the
 “ Limits of his Command.”

All these Contradictions are to pave the Way for the A——l’s acting quite different from his Instructions, under Pretence of the “ different Aspect of Things on the Admiral’s Arrival at *Gibraltar*, from that which they had been made to wear in *England*” (as he immediately says in the same Period) “ a Difference of Conduct became absolutely necessary,” But why did not he frame some tolerable Excuse for the A——l’s staying at *Gibraltar* from the 2d of *May* to the 8th, when the only Pretence of waiting for the Resolutions of the Court Martial, in regard to the sending a Detachment from the Garrison (which the Admiral should have protested against, instead of having ratified) did not exist after the 4th of *May* ? Why could not he have persuaded us, that he, and his able Secretaries, were from that Time to the 7th, producing the Dispatches sent by Lieutenant *Obara*, though they were only Duplicates of those sent by the Way of *Madrid* the 4th ? For it
 is

is here that we begin to approach that Part of the Admiral's Conduct which requires so much Vindication, and for which so little is offered—What he did at *Portsmouth* from the 20th of *March* to the 5th of *April*, we are told with as much Precision, as if it were a Relation of his Conduct on the 20th of *May*; the only Point that is necessary to be discussed, in relation to his Guilt or his Innocence; but this Writer, like all those that have preceded him in their Vindication of the A——l, have turned pale, and trembled when they came to this —— and owned, that if they had any Thing to say in his Defence, they would defer it to his Trial: So that, in short, after he has worked up our Attention, with thirty-six Pages of the A——l's Life, and we are in Expectation that the whole Affair is upon the Point of being unravelled, we find the real Subject of all our Perplexity for these four Months, that is, “ The Particulars of what followed cannot “ be expected there.”

Thus are we left as much in the dark after the Publication of the A——l's three Pamphlets (for such I believe they may be called without much Impropriety, tho' perhaps he had very little Hand in their penning) as we were immediately upon the Publication of the Extract of his Letter in the *Gazette*. No Cause is assigned for the Length of Time he took up
in

in going to *Gibraltar*; his tarrying there six Days; his not landing the Succours at *Mahon*; his throwing the *Deptford* out of the Line; his not having (with his Division) engaged the *French Fleet*; his not pursuing (at least permitting those that were so inclined) the vanquished *Gallissonniere*.

I next come to what has been wrote against the A——l, or in Favour of the Administration. In this I shall include none of the low Scurrility, and self-retorting Sarcasms of *Grub-street*, which swarmed, while the effigizing Spirit prevailed. These were greater Satyrs upon their Authors, than the A——l. But those that have appeared, since Mr. B——g has judged proper indirectly to defend his own Cause, may merit our Attention: the Number is very small, I know not whether I can collect two. However, the “Conduct of the Ministry impartially examined,” is that which shall find a Place here first.

If the Writer of this Piece had been more particular than what he has, in regard to Mr. B——g's Conduct, I believe I should not have troubled the Public now with this Performance; but as he has not, I have endeavoured to supply the Place of what he left unsaid; since we might have expected, from the Pen of the Writer of the following Passage, such a Confutation
to

to the main Argument, stated in a Letter to a Member, &c. so artfully spun out in the Appeal, and endeavoured to be supported in "Further Particulars in relation to the Case of Mr. B—g," as I flatter myself the Reader has found in these Sheets.

This Writer, to demonstrate the Absurdity of making such a Pother about the Omission of a single Word, which might be attributed to an Error of the Press, if there were any Need of a Subterfuge for denying the Fact, makes the following ingenious and just Observation, "Whether the Word *cover Gibraltar* " was omitted or not, is immaterial to Mr. " B—g's Vindication. It is besides glaringly " absurd. Does he not say in his Letter of " the 25th of *May*, *That he gained a Victory?* " Did not some other Hand, who has put his " Anger into tolerable *English*, in a second " Letter, dated *July 4*, say still more affirmatively, *that he fought, met, attacked, and* " *beat the Enemy?* How cou'd the *French* come " to *Gibraltar* without their Fleet? Or was a " beaten Fleet in Condition to engage him " there? What had he then to cover? Not " *Gibraltar* surely."

The Author makes some very judicious Observations upon the Fallacy of Mr. B—g's Advocates; but as the Scope of this Work is not intended

intended to remark our *Mediterranean* Affairs in particular, but as an Examination of the Conduct of the Ministry in general, since the Commencement of the present War, we need not be surprized, that he has so slightly touched upon the Behaviour of our A——l: But a Performance that has just made its Appearance under the Title of “An Appeal to Reason and Common Sense,” having nothing in View but the Examination of the Point before us, we might have expected some newer and more just Observations upon the Pamphlets published in Favour of Mr. B—g, than what he has favoured us with; for instead of confuting the Appeal (which he so much derides) he has only said he looks upon it as an ironical Piece; though I must confess, it no where carries so much Resemblance of Irony, as does his own Production, where he speaks of a Pamphlet, intituled, “Impartial Reflections.” And there could be no Reason that would prevent me believing he meant to ridicule it, if I did not very much suspect him to be the Author as well of “Impartial Reflections,” as an “Appeal to Reason and Common Sense.”

Now that I have mentioned the Pamphlet, intituled, “Impartial Reflections on the Case of Mr. B—g:” I think myself under some Necessity of informing the Reader of the Contents. The Author tells us, in a very circumlocutive

locutive manner, that it appears the M——y, as well as the A——l, are culpable; and that if it should prove upon a fair Trial they are so, they ought to be punished according to their Demerits: Although I do not adopt this Principle (since as yet I have no Reason to imagine any but the A——l guilty) I will state it as an Hypothesis, and fairly argue what Right the A——l can claim, from the M——y being equally guilty with himself, that he should not be punished——Surely, if there is a Simile in Nature (upon the same Hypothesis) to the A——l's Case, it must be that of a Servant who has been sent out to rob, by his Master, and is caught in the Fact. Now will the Master's having ordered his Man to go upon the Highway, anywise exculpate him? If it can be proved the Master was an Accomplice, he will suffer too; but the Servant can never go unpunished.

Then what avails it to prove (if it were possible) that the M——y were composed of a Set of the greatest Knaves in *Christendom*, that they instructed A——l B——g to loiter away six Weeks before he got to *Mahon*; then not to succour the Castle; and run away from the *French Fleet*, under Pretence of its greater Weight of Metal; nay, we will go further, we will even suppose it to be proved, that the Duke of —, my Lord —, and Mr. —, were every

every one of them bribed by the *French* Ambassador, before his Departure from *England*, with the three hundred thousand Pounds, insinuated to be remitted here for that Purpose. Does this any wise attest Mr. *B—g's* Innocence? Does not this rather corroborate his accumulated Guilt? Even in a great Measure tend to prove, that he was in the secret (otherwise he had no such Instructions) and that he had not even Courage enough to make a sham Fight, to save Appearances?

The whole Merits of the Cause are, Whether or no he was guilty of retarding the Service he went upon? Why he reduced the Strength of his Fleet, by putting the *Deptford* out of the Line? &c. Whether his Division of the Fleet, fought on the 20th of *May*? Or, if it did not, what Reason he can give for not having engaged? For having endeavoured to prevent Mr. *West's* Division being assisted? Why he did not pursue the vanquished Enemy (conquered by *only six of his Ships*) with his whole Fleet? For it is upon the Examination of these Points, that he must stand or fall, as he will be tried upon the following Articles of War, *viz.*

Art. 12. Every Person in the Fleet, who thro' Cowardice, Negligence or Disaffection, shall in Time of Action *withdraw* or *keep back*,

or not come into the Fight or Engagement, or shall not do his utmost to take or destroy every Ship which it shall be his Duty to engage, and to assist and relieve all and every of his Majesty's Ships, or those of his Allies, which it shall be his Duty to assist and relieve; every such Person, so offending, and being convicted thereof by the Sentence of a Court Martial, shall suffer Death.

Art. 13. Every Person in the Fleet, who thro' Cowardice, Negligence, or Disaffection shall *forbear to pursue the Chace* of an Enemy, Pirate or Rebel, *beaten*, or flying; or shall not *relieve and assist a known Friend* * in View to the utmost of his Power; being convicted of any such Offence, by the Sentence of a Court Martial, shall suffer Death.

But is it to be wondered at that he should not *relieve and assist* a known Friend in the Day of Action, who not content by his ill Conduct to throw an indelible Scandal upon his King, his Country, the *British* Arms and Valour; has since his Arrival here done every Thing in his Power to brand with Infamy, those very Men who had listened to his Prayer, in Preference to

* Surely the Rear Admiral was such — how well he relieved and assisted him we all know.

many of as noble untainted Blood as any this Kingdom can boast, and had entrusted him with a Command, not only the most honestly lucrative, but the most Important of any that has occurred during this War; whereby he might have accumulated Riches and Glory, and rendered his Name famous and revered in the *British* Annals? Ingratitude and Cowardice, are so seldom separated, that the one is the never-failing Index of the other.

However illiterate his *best* Letters have made him appear, the most partial of his Censurers, must acknowledge he possesses a *Low-cunning*, that is frequently more useful to a Man than a refined Intellect, or great Abilities. His Behaviour since his Arrival here particularly illustrates this: He waited with Patience, as many thought for his Trial, without offering any Thing in his Defence; others were of Opinion, that he deferred publishing his Apology, till such Time as the Clamour of the People should be subsided, that they might give him an impartial and unprejudiced Hearing; but this was far from being the Case — he waited only till such Time as some popular Subject, should call in Question the Conduct of the Ministry, and then it was he designed to play off his Artillery upon them — for if the Affair of the *Hanoverian* Soldier, or the Loss of *Oswego* had not

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occurred

occurred, the Member of Parliament * would have had no Correspondent — the People no Appealer. But these Topics having been the Incentive to the popular Censure of the Administration, the Ad—l joined in the general Cry, and Doctor — being the readiest Hireling, he was set to work to impose upon the Public, and impute such atrocious Crimes to the M—ry, that I shudder lest my Pen by too near approaching the Subject) should erroneously transcribe some of his infamous calumnies.

Thus we see that the Ad—l was conscious the Fallacies made use of to soften his Conduct would make no Impression upon the Public— He knew that they required some auxiliary Events to make them demand Attention ; and if they have had any Weight with the Public, he is more indebted to the Theft of the *Hanoverian*, who stole a Handkerchief ; than— who has pick'd his Pocket in writing him such a Defence.

Let us examine without Prejudice or Prepossession, what Grounds there can be for the insidious Assertions which are every where found dispersed in Ad—l B—g's three Pamphlets, and some others, which carry with them

* The first Pamphlet published in his Favour.

them manifest Tokens of their Authors and Patrons : I mean the Guilt of the M——y, with Regard to the Loss of *Minorca*. If they acted according to the best of their Judgment, and either Accident or the Ad——l's Ill-Conduct was the Cause of it, they stand unimpeached. But if on the other Hand they were Accomplices, and the Ad——l was only the Executioner, and not the Judge who pronounced Sentence upon the Amputation of this Limb of the *British* Monarchy—the Prime M——r, the Sec——ys of State, and the Com——rs of the Ad———ty (at least) must have been all Conspirators : to suppose this we must imagine that directly or indirectly it would turn to their Interest, and could this be without they were bribed by the *French* Court ? But altho' the Report of the *French* Ambassador having remitted here 300,000 l. a little before his Departure, is of that Nature to be credited by none but Children or Ideots, since the drawing of such a Sum upon any Merchant in *London*, must not only have made too much Noise to have been a Secret at the very Time of its being paid ; but he could not have received it at any one Banker's in the City of *London*, either in Specie or Notes ; we will merely for the Argument imagine the Fact. Now let us suppose an exact Division of this Sum, and that every one had 25,000 l. apiece (which is the very utmost, since there must

have been at least twelve concerned, and none would dare claim a larger Share than another, for Fear of creating Discontent)——can any reasonable Man imagine, that if the M——rs could have been Rogues enough to have accepted of such a Bribe, they would hesitate to rob the Nation; and can we, with any Colour of Sense, suppose that a Prime M——r could not find Ways and Means (if so disposed) to rob the National Treasure, not only of Twenty-five thousand Pounds, but (almost) as many Millions, and with much greater Security to himself, if he had been in that Employ conjunctive and separate for thirty Years? These Questions are so obvious, they answer themselves—I would not pay so bad a Compliment to my Reader's Capacity, as to furnish him with a Reply, but conclude there is not a Spark of Probability to support the Insinuation of the Acceptance of such a Bribe——then all that remains to be examined, after it is proved beyond Contradiction, the M——rs could have no Interest in betraying *Minorca*, is whether they can be supposed to be void of all Grains of personal regard, of common Sense, or even common Prudence, to wantonly betray a Place of such Importance, bring an eternal Stain upon their Admin——n, injure their private Property, cause their own Overthrow, and disgrace themselves and every their remote Relation——merely for the Sake of being

ing brought to condign Punishment. An Administration may be weak, or even wicked; wrong Measures may be taken for want of Intelligence, by ill Fortune——or even purposely——Bribery and Cor——n may reign in the—— and the M——rs may pack——, our Enemies may profit of the Inability of our Leaders, and beat us by Land and Sea——while our Ad——ls are weighing every Gun of the Enemies Ships, to prove, (upon false Principles) they had a few Pounds more Metal, as a Cause for their not engaging or running away——all this and much more may some Time or other have been the Case, but to imagine that any Man, or set of Men, M——rs or others, would plan a Measure from whence they could derive no Profit, reap no Honour——but render themselves liable to the most exemplary Punishment, only to hurt their Country, which never injured them, but on the contrary, protected, cherished, and amply rewarded them—is to suppose a Fact without Precedent in History——beyond every one's Comprehension——uncredited by even those that would suppose it.

Thus we perceive there can be no Grounds for imagining the M——ry privy to any Design of betraying *Minorca* into the Hands of the *French*——they are proved Innocent upon the most convincing Evidence, drawn from an
Argument

Argument of a Supposition of their Guilt ; so that if there could have been any Treachery, that promoted our Loss of this important Island, who can be criminal but the very Person who was charged with the Relief of it? Yet I would not be so uncharitable as to imagine the A——l guilty of any other Crimes than the Want of Courage and Conduct convicted him of, if not that the Love of Gain prompted him to solicit a Command that he was conscious he was unqualified for, and had not the Intention to execute : I believe he did not reflect upon the Importance of the Loss of *Minorca*—otherwise he would have succoured it ; the Honour of the *British* Flag, perhaps, he had no Idea of ; nor did he, I am of opinion imagine the Consequences of a *Poltroon-Behaviour* would be so fatal to himself ; he very likely believed a specious Representation of the Affair, such a one (without the insolent Attacks made upon the M——ry) as we find in the Appeal, would satisfy the People of his good Conduct, and the next advantageous Command, where little Fighting was to be expected, no *French* Ships of War to be encountered, but many Merchantmen to fall in his Way, would come to his Lot : So that it does not appear the A——l has been so very culpable, without Malversation and Cowardice can be construed so criminal.

Although

Although I cannot betray my Sentiments sufficiently to turn Advocate for the Ad—l, I own I am not void of all Grains of Compassion for him ; I am sorry to see him made the Tool of designing Men ; for as his pretended Advocates say, so he certainly has been ; or else who could imagine, that he would have exposed himself by so trifling a Defence, as Dr. — has made for him. What but the Love of Lucre could have excited this Son of *Hippocrates*, to persuade him to the Publication of his Case, wherein so little is said in his favour that could recommend him to the People, or even appease their Wrath. Does he imagine, because the effigizing Spirit is subsided, they are reconciled to his Conduct ; as well might he think, every Day we do not burn the Pope and the Pretender, we are proselytes to their Cause. The fact is, the People begin to think they have thrown away too much Money, in executing by Proxy, one who already has cost their Country so dear : Their Indignation is neither appeased nor exhausted, but smother'd under a Cloud of Melancholy, the Vapours of his ill Conduct have formed ; and nothing can dissipate it but the gallant Behaviour of some of our Commanders, who shall teach the Successor of *Gallissoniere* (who is now no more) that *British* Valour is still in its Meridian ; that our Flag
claims

claims that Dominion, it has ever supported; and that *Gallic* Perfidy must at last submit to *English* Justice.

The Artifice Mr. B—g has used, to screen himself under the imputed Guilt of the M—y, has been so glaring, that every reasonable Person has seen through it, and those that were inclined to believe he could make some tolerable Defence, are now convinced, from what has been published, that he must have Recourse to the most notorious Infractions on Truth, the most infamous Attacks of unsullied Reputation, to prove ——— what? not that he fought on the 20th of *May*, as he ought to have done; but that, after having gained a Victory with six Ships of his Squadron, whilst he lay with his Topsail to the Mast, and five Ships astern; instead of attempting to relieve *Minorca*, the Errand he was sent upon, he run away with his whole Squadron to *Gibraltar*, to cover a Place that was in no Danger. In short, the very Men who, out of Compassion, would not give their Opinion before they heard his Defence, are now obliged to own, *he has nothing to say for himself*; or indeed has he attempted it, as has been already proved, in either of the Pamphlets, for which he must have furnished the Materials, which no ways exculpate him, and paid for the Writing.

I own

I own I pity him, for having been thus duped by these Hirelings, who must have flattered him with changing the Opinion of the People, by a Publication of his Defence, which so far from having had this Success, it has obliged those, who would have suspended their Judgment till they had heard both Sides, to no longer remain Neuter, but make an open Declaration against him: These he might have still continued undecided, till his trial; who, if, they were of no Weight for him, would, at least, have been prevented from becoming his Accusers.

There is but one Way left for him, to recover what he has lost by the Publication of the three Pamphlets, that are attributed to him; to wipe off the additional Stains of Ingratitude and Defamation, which he has added to Cowardice and ill Conduct; that is, by writing, or causing to be wrote for him, a general Recantation of all the false Accusations of the M——y; insolent Abuse of the Public, by such manifest Interpolations of his own Letter; intentional Mistakes in regard to the Weight of Metal, Number of Guns, and Force of the two Fleets, by omitting where the Occasion served, not only Part of the Guns, but even the Names of some of the Ships, that composed his very Squadron; with a long Train of injudicious Reasoning and Fallacy, tending to
impose

impose upon the People's Judgment, at the Price of his Sense and Honesty, which are all to be found in these three Pieces.

If the A———l has Penetration enough to perceive the Weight of this Advice, I must remind him, that it will be absolutely necessary to sign his Name at length to his Recantation ; and if he should propose making Use of any published Defence, either Whole or in Part, upon his Trial, this will be the most conducive to apologize for some Part of his imputed Conduct.

I cannot help taking Notice of another false Politic of the A———l, in having his Trial deferred till the coming Home of those Gentlemen for Witnesses, whom he had so ill used in the *Mediterranean*. Does he think Captains *Baird*, *Edgcumbe*, *Catford* and *Younge*, can say any Thing in his Favour, since the very Victory he pretends to claim he had no Hand in, but is indebted to them for (with Captain *Andrews*, dead, and Captain *Everitt* returned *) and yet would not give them the least Assistance, but on the contrary, threatened to fire upon the *Revenge*, *Princess Louisa*, and *Culloden*, for going to their Aid ; and upon his Arrival at *Gibraltar*, tried Captains *Cornwall*

* I do not mention Admiral *West*, since the noble Part he took in the Engagement, *B—g* himself has been obliged to extol.

Wall and *Ward* for breaking the Line, and going to the Assistance of the six Ships engaged with the *French*; I say, can he reasonably believe, that these honourable Gentlemen, will, in Despite of Truth, and in return for the kind Treatment receiv'd from the A—I, depose in his Favour, what he himself has not yet been impudent enough to assert; namely, that he actually fought the Enemy; or, as the 12th Article of War expresses it, did not, “withdraw or “keep back,” or, did “come into the Fight or “Engagement;” or that he pursued the vanquished *French* Fleet, and assisted to the utmost of his Power that part of his Squadron that engaged; or, as the 13th Article of War expresses it, did not “forbear to pursue the chase “of an Enemy, Pirate, or Rebel, beaten or “flying;” or did “relieve and assist a known “Friend in View to the utmost of his Power?”

I know not whether this Production may meet with the Approbation of the Public; but if Truth gleaned from Prejudice, and Reason divested of Sophistry, can depict the real state of the mysterious Affair before us, and the impartial World would chuse to see it developed of all those delusive Trappings it has hitherto worn, I flatter myself, this Piece may have its merit, and may not be an unwelcome offering at this Time to the Public: For in whatever Remarks I have made upon the A—I's Conduct, no Party Connections,

nections, no self-interested Bias have made me swerve from Truth, or blinded me from the Pursuit of it: If I have not approved his Conduct, it has been because I thought it wrong; I bear the Man *no Enmity*; for let him really convince the World he has acted just, I shall be the Foremost in the Rank of his Advocates. But I never will prostitute my Pen in Favour of one, who can be suspected to have aided his Country's Ruin; to have blemished the national Honour by his Poltroonery; to have preferred his own private Gain to the Nation's Welfare; but shall think it my Duty to point out all artful Representations of a Delinquent's Conduct to delude the Public; every Machination of a Culprit's Hireling to impose upon Mankind, either by a false representation of Facts, or by unsupported Assertions; to cast the blame upon an innocent Man, though in Power; to confute Error, and fairly state the Case, where the Community is so deeply concerned, and leave the impartial World to judge for itself. To this End I shall never think my Pen unworthily employed; whatever my Talents may be, my Intention's honest; and even to fail in a virtuous Cause, is still some Glory.

F I N I S.

